Virus Database

Exploit.IFrame.FileDownload

Description Exploit.IFrame.FileDownload

Exploit takes advantage of a security breach in MS Internet Explorer 5.01, 5.5 and Outlook.
Some Internet worms use this breach to activate themselves from HTML e-mail messages. Examples of such worms are: Aliz, BadtransII, Nimda, and Toil.
This vulnerability allows for the opening or previewing of an infected HTML e-mail message to activate any file or program attached to a message without any security warning from MS Internet Explorer. This breach may also be used in any HTML page (as I-Worm.Nimda does).
This security breach in MS Internet Explorer was discovered in March 2001, and described in the Microsoft Security Bulletin at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-020.asp.
The patch eliminating this breach was released by Microsoft on 29 March 2001, and is available for downloading at http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/downloads/critical/q290108/default.asp.

Check other viruses! Be aware! Use Antiviral Software

I-Worm.Hybris.a

Description I-Worm.Hybris.a

This is an Internet worm that spreads attached to e-mail messages. The worm works under Win32 systems only. The worm contains components (plugins) in its code that are executed depending on the worm's needs, and these components can be upgraded from an Internet Web site.
The major worm versions are encrypted with a semi-polymorphic encryption loop.
The worm contains the text strings:
HYBRIS
(c) Vecna
The Worm Runs
The main worm target on a computer is the WSOCK32.DLL library. While infecting this file, the worm:
writes itself to the end of the last file section
hooks "connect", "recv", and "send" functions
modifies the DLL entry routine address (a routine that is activated when a DLL file is being loaded) and encrypts the original entry routine
If the worm is not able to infect WSOCK32.DLL (in case it is in use and is locked for writing), the virus creates a copy of that library (a copy of WSOCK32.DLL with random name), infects it and writes a "rename" instruction to WININIT.INI file. As a result, WSOCK32.DLL will be replaced with an infected image upon the next Windows startup.
The worm also creates its copy with a random name in the Windows system directory and registers it in the RunOnce registry key:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce {Default} = %WinSystem%WormName
or
HKEY_CURRENT_USERSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce {Default} = %WinSystem%WormName
where %WinSystem% is the Windows system directory, and "WormName" is a random eight symbols name, for example:
CCMBOIFM.EXE
LPHBNGAE.EXE
LFPCMOIF.EXE
There is only possible reason for registering an additional worm copy in the "RunOnce" registry key: in case WSOCK32.DLL was not infected during the first worm run, and its infected copy was not created because of some reason, the "RunOnce" worm copy will complete the task upon the next Windows restart.
Infected WSOCK32.DLL
The worm intercepts Windows functions that establish a network connection, including the Internet. The worm intercepts data that are sent and received, and scans them for e-mail addresses. When an address(es) is/are detected, the worm waits for some time and then sends an infected message to that/those address(es).
Plugins
The worm's functionality depends on the plugins that are stored in worm body encrypted with a RSA-like strong crypto algorithm with a 128-bit key. There are up to 32 plugins that can be found in different worm versions. These plugins perform different actions that can be updates from a Web page:
http://pleiku.vietmedia.com/bye/
so the complete worm functionality depends only on its host that is able to upgrade plugins on a Web page. The plugins on a page are encrypted with RSA-like crypto too.
The worm also updates its plugins by the using alt.comp.virus newsgroup. The worm, being active on a machine, connects to a news server (by using one of randomly selected servers - there are more than 70 addresses in the list), converts its plugins to newsgroup messages and posts them there. The Worm's messages have a random-like Subject, for example:
encr HVGT GTeLKzurGbGvqnuDqbivKfCHWbizyXiPOvKD
encr CMBK bKfOjafCjyfWnqLqzSTWTuDmfefyvurSLeXGHqR
text LNLM LmnajmnKDyfebuLuPaPmzaLyXGXKPSLSXWjKvWnyDWbGH
text RFRE rebibmTCDOzGbCjSZ
where first four chores are plugin "name" and following four chores are an encoded plugin "version". As well as sending, the worm reads such messages from alt.comp.virus, obtains the plugin "name" and "version" and compares them with plugins that are currently used by the worm. In case the newsgroup has a message with a higher plugin version, the worm extracts it and replaces the existing one. So the worm uses alt.comp.virus to upgrade its plugins.
The worm also creates these plugins as disk files in the Windows system directory. They also have a random name, but the worm keeps being able to access them. The names may look as follow:
BIBGAHNH.IBG
DACMAPKO.ACM
GAFIBPFM.AFI
IMALADOL.MAL
MALADOLI.ALA
There are several different known plugins that:
1. Infect all ZIP and RAR archives on all available drives from C: till Z:. While infecting, the worm renames EXE files in the archive with a .EX$ extension and adds its copy with a .EXE extension to the archive (companion method of infection).
2. Send messages with encoded plugins to the "alt.comp.virus" neewsgroup, and obtains new plugins from there.
3. Spread virus to remote machines that have a SubSeven backdoor Trojan installed. The plugin detects such machines on the Net, and using SubSeven commands, uploads a worm copy to the machine and spawns it in there.
4. Encrypt worm copies with a polymorphic encryption loop before sending the copy attached to an e-mail.
5. Depending on system date and time (on September 16 and 24, and on 59 minute of each hour starting from year 2001 - in known plugins) the "spirale" effect is run.
The plugin creates random 8-bytes .EXE name in Windows system directory, unpacks "spirale effect" EXE code to there, and registers that file in the system:
under Win9x: in WIN.INI file in [windows] "run=" line under WinNT: in system registry in "Run=" key
6. Affects DOS EXE and Windows PE EXE files. The worm affects them so that they become to be worm droppers. When run they drop worm EXE file to TEMP directory and execute it.
While affecting DOS EXE file the plugin adds dropper code and worm body to the end of the file. These files are disinfectable.
While affecting Windows PE EXE file the plugin overwrites file code section to get a gap for worm code, and writes worm dropper code to that gap (if is has enough size). The plugin doesn't touch file header (including entry point address), and does not increase file size. Moreover, it has a anti-CRC (chechsum) routine that fill special data in plugin code so that file CRC becomes the same for few common used CRC algorithms. That means, that some integrity checkers will not detect changes in affected files: the file length and file body CRC stay the same as on clean file.
When such PE EXE file is run, the dropper code drops and activates the worm, then restores (unpacks) code section and returns control to the host file.
7. Randomly select a Subject, Message text and Attach name while sending the worm copies with e-mail messages:
From:
Hahaha [hahaha@sexyfun.net]
Subjects:
Snowhite and the Seven Dwarfs - The REAL story!

Branca de Neve porn!
Enanito si, pero con que pedazo!
Les 7 coquir nains
Message texts:
C'etait un jour avant son dix huitieme anniversaire. Les 7 nains, qui avaient aidù 'blanche neige' toutes ces annùes aprøs qu'elle se soit enfuit de chez sa belle møre, lui avaient promis une *grosse* surprise. A 5 heures comme toujours, ils sont rentrùs du travail. Mais cette fois ils avaient un air coquinall
Today, Snowhite was turning 18. The 7 Dwarfs always where very educated and polite with Snowhite. When they go out work at mornign, they promissed a *huge* surprise. Snowhite was anxious. Suddlently, the door open, and the Seven Dwarfs enter...
Faltaba apenas un dia para su aniversario de de 18 aTos. Blanca de Nieve fuera siempre muy bien cuidada por los enanitos. Ellos le prometieron una *grande* sorpresa para su fiesta de compleaTos. Al entardecer, llegaron. Tenian un brillo incomun en los ojos...
Faltava apenas um dia para o seu aniversario de 18 anos. Branca de Neve estava muito feliz e ansiosa, porque os 7 an¿es prometeram uma *grande* surpresa. As cinco horas, os an¿ezinhos voltaram do trabalho. Mas algo nao estava bem... Os sete an¿ezinhos tinham um estranho brilho no olhar...
Attach names:
enano.exe
enano porno.exe
blanca de nieve.scr
enanito fisgon.exe
sexy virgin.scr
joke.exe
midgets.scr
dwarf4you.exe
blancheneige.exe
sexynain.scr
blanche.scr
nains.exe
branca de neve.scr
atchim.exe
dunga.scr
anóo porn.scr
As well as (depending on the plugin version):
The message Subject is a random combination of:
Anna + sex
Raquel Darian sexy
Xena hot
Xuxa hottest
Suzete cum
famous cumshot
celebrity rape horny
leather ... e.t.c.

Attach name:
Anna.exe
Raquel Darian.exe
Xena.exe
Xuxa.exe
Suzete.exe
famous.exe
celebrity rape.exe
leather.exe
sex.exe
sexy.exe
hot.exe
hottest.exe
cum.exe
cumshot.exe
horny.exe
anal.exe
gay.exe
oral.exe
pleasure.exe
asian.exe
lesbians.exe
teens.exe
virgins.exe
boys.exe
girls.exe
SM.exe
sado.exe
cheerleader.exe
orgy.exe
black.exe
blonde.exe
sodomized.exe
hardcore.exe
slut.exe
doggy.exe
suck.exe
messy.exe
kinky.exe
fist-fucking.exe
amateurs.exe
The attached file name may also be a random eight bytes .EXE name, for example:
ADELHHAD.EXE
CFIMMHAG.EXE
DIEOPIDI.EXE
EABLLNEA.EXE
FKPODKFK.EXE
HJEOINHJ.EXE
OGNNFEOG.EXE
PFFCKEPF.EXE

I-Worm.Icecubes.a

Description I-Worm.Icecubes.a

This is an Internet worm that spreads as an attachment via e-mail. The worm itself is a Windows executable file about 18Kb in length. Upon being executed from an e-mail attachment, the worm installs itself to the system and hides its activity utilizing a humerous dialogue box that "configures" Windows icecubes.


While installing, the worm copies itself to the Windows system directory with WSOCK2.DLL name (note: not WSOCK32.DLL, not WSOCK2.VXD), and infects the original WSOCK32.DLL Windows library by writing its code to the end of the file. This library is usually locked by Windows for writing, and the worm uses a standard stick: it copies that file with a WSOCK32.INF name, infects this copy, and writes a "rename" command to the WININIT.INI file, which in turn will replace the original WSOCK32.DLL with an infected one upon the next Windows restart.
The worm code in the infected WSOCK32.DLL hooks the "send" function, and monitors all data that are sent. When a message is outgoing, the worm duplicates it with a second message with an attached ICECUBES.EXE file and:
Subject: Windows Icecubes !
Text:
I almost forgot. Look at what I found on the web. This tool scans your system for hidden Windows settings, better known as -Windows Icecubes-. These secret settings were built in by the Windows programmers. I think you might want to change them a little, just take a look ! :)
The worm also logs Internet login names and passwords to a ICECUBE.TXT file in the Windows directory.
On July 1st, the worm displays the following message:
W9x.Icecubes / f0re [lz0]

Windows detected icecubes on your harddrive.
This may cause the system to stop responding.
Do you want Windows to remove all icecubes ?

Home