Virus Database

I-Worm.Magold.a

Description I-Worm.Magold.a

This worm spreads via the Internet as an attachment to infected emails. It also spreads via IRC channels, local and file sharing networks. The worm is able to spread in WinNT systems only (WinNT, Win2000, WinXP).
The worm itself is a Windows PE EXE file approximately 241Kb in size. It is compressed using UPX; the decompressed file is approximately 650KB in size. It is written in Borland C++.
Installation
When installing, the worm copies itself to the Windows directory under the names "raVe.exe" and "Maya Gold.scr". It then registers these files in as a key in the system registry to ensure that the files are run each time the system is started.
[HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun]
raVe = %WinDir% aVe.exe
[HKLMSOFTWAREClassesexefileshellopencommand]
@=%WinDir% aVe.exe "%1" %*"
[HKLMSOFTWAREClassescomfileshellopencommand]
@=%WinDir% aVe.exe "%1" %*"
[HKLMSOFTWAREClassesatfileshellopencommand]
@=%WinDir% aVe.exe "%1" %*"
[HKLMSOFTWAREClassespiffileshellopencommand]
@=%WinDir% aVe.exe "%1" %*"
[HKLMSOFTWAREClassesscrfileshellopencommand]
@=%WinDir% aVe.exe "%1" %*"
The worm also creates a subdirectory " aVe" in Windows directory and copies itself to there under the name "Maya Gold.scr". This directory is then registered in the system registry as a Kazaa shared folder:
[HKCUSoftwareKazaaTransfer]
DlDir0 = %WinDir% aVe
This enables the worm to spread via the Kazaa P2P file-sharing network.
The worm also creates three registry keys for its own use:
[HKLMSoftware aVe]
beepul
halozat
irc
The worm then displays a fake error message:

Propagation via email
To send infected messages the worm connects directly to the default SMTP server. The worm harvests email addresses from the WAB (Windows Address Book) database (Windows Address Book) and *.HTML files.
Infected messages:
From:
erotika@lap.hu
Subject:
Maya Gold-os kepernyokimelo!
Attachment:
Maya Gold.scr
Message body (original in Hungarian):
Tisztelt cÜm!
Az EROTIKA.LAP.HU nÝzettsÝgÝnek n?velÝse ÝrdekÝben egy kis ÜzelÜt?t kÜvÓn adni kÜnÓlatÓb?l az Internet felhasznÓl?knak!
FIGYELEM: A 'Maya Gold.scr' nevv csatolt ÓllomÓny egy kÝperny?vÝd?. Mint a neve is mutatja Maya Gold porn?szÜnÝszn?r?l tartalmaz k?l?nb?z? kÝpeket. Az ÓllomÓnyt ajÓnlott el?bb a lemezre menteni, majd utÓna futtatni.
Amennyiben valami problÝmÓja, kÝrdÝse van, Ürjon a k?vetkez? cÜmre: erotika@lap.hu
_dv?zlettel: EROTIKA.LAP.HU
Translation:
Dear Recipient!
The EROTIKA.LAP.HU website is providing Internet users with a preview of its offerings, in the hope of increasing its popularity.
Attention: The attached "Maya Gold.scr" file is a screen saver. As the name implies, it contains pictures of Maya Gold, the acclaimed porn diva.
It is recommeded to save the file to disk before running it.
If you have any problems or questions, please contact us at:
erotika@lap.hu
Best Wishes: EROTIKA.LAP.HU
The worm is only activated when a user opens the attachment by clicking on it. The worm then installs itself to the system and starts propagating.
Propagation via networked and floppy drives
The worm copies itself to shared network drives. To ensure that the copy will run on the remote victim machine, the worm writes an auto-start command to the victim machine "Autorun.inf":
open=Maya Gold.scr
The worm also copies itself under the name "Maya Gold.scr" to the A: floppy drive.
Propagation via IRC
The worm affects two IRC clients and writes script files to their directories. These scripts send a copy of the worm file to IRC channels to users that join infected channels. The affected IRC clients and script file names are:
mIRC - script.ini
Pirch - events.ini
Propagation via file sharing networks
The worm affects the following P2P networks:
Bearshare
Edonkey
Gnucleus
Grokster
Kazaa
Limewire
Morpheus
Shareaza
The worm copies itself to these networks under the name "Maya Gold.scr".
The worm also copies itself to the "ICQShared Folder".
Other
The worm downloads and runs upgrades from "ftp.fw.hu".
The worm may open the site "http://www.offspring.com".
The worm searches for and terminates active anti-virus processes.
At a certain stage after being activated, the worm:
changes the colour of active application windows

won't allow mouse cursor to get to the top of the screen (blocks it)
creates numerous empty "raVe%%%.txt" files on the Desktop

changes active application window header to:
=:-) OFFSPRING is coOL =:-) PUNK'S NOT DEAD =:-)
sends the following text to the printer:
SEGITS NEKEM!!!
En a nyomtato vagyok, es arra szeretnelek megkerni, hogy beszelj mar a Windows-zal, mert ez mar nem allapot!!
Allandoan a hulye kerdeseivel, kereseivel zaklat, 'Van meg lapod?', 'Tudsz szinesen nyomtatni?', 'Ezt most fektetve szeretnem!', 'Keszen allsz mar?'.
Gondolom te is egyetertesz velem, hogy ez igy nem mehet tovabb! Valamit tenni kell!
UDVOZLETTEL MEGERTO ES SEGITOKESZ BARATOD: A NYOMTATO
PUNK'S NOT DEAD
=:-)
=:-)
=:-)
The smileys are repeated to the bottom of the page. The Hungarian text is a complaint about the low quality and problems of printer implementation in Microsoft Windows.
The worm contains the text string:
AZERT SEM KOSZONOK BE BE BE! SOT! EBBEN SINCS KOSZONET! --- raVe-1-- areWera

Check other viruses! Be aware! Use Antiviral Software

Linux.Rike.1627

Description Linux.Rike.1627
Rike is a non-dangerous nonmemory resident parasitic virus. It searches for Linux executable files in the current directory, then writes itself to the middle of the file. It's size is 1627 bytes and is written in the Assembler programming language.
The Rike virus uses low level Linux functions when working with files: SYS CALLS INT 80h. While infecting a file the virus scans sections with the attribute SHT_PROGBITS. Rike increases the size of the last section and writes itself to the free space. Next, the virus inserts a Jump command to the Entry Point address.
The virus writes its label to the ELF header. The label is the string "RIKE".

Linux.RST

Description Linux.RST

This text was written by Costin Raiu, Kaspersky Labs, Romania
This is a Linux virus that also implements several backdoor facilities, allowing an attacker to take control of the system infected with it in case the virus has been executed on account with root priviledges. The virus infects all the Linux binary executables in the current directory and the /bin directory, and listens to the first network card 'eth0' as well on the first PPP connection interface, and 'ppp0' for special packets sent in the EGP communication protocol. Whenever such a special package arrives, the virus allows the attacker to take control of the system with a root shell.
The virus will also attempt to create two new devices in the /dev directory, named "/dev/hdx1" and "/dev/hdx2", and tries to access a Web page on the ns1.xoasis.com web server.
Technical details:
The viral part works by attaching itself to normal ELF executables, patching their header, and moving the entrypoint to the viral code. At the same time, the virus relocates all the data found after the original host code to the end of its own code. It is interesting to note that the virus also performs an anti-debugging check by seeing whether the current process is 'ptrace'-ed. If so, it will immediately terminate execution. If not, the virus looks for all the files in the current directory, and attempts to infect them. After this, it will also attempt to infect all the files in the '/bin' directory, which under normal conditions will only work if the infected program has been run under an account with higher privileges. There is no attempt in the viral code to exploit any Linux vulnerabilities in order to obtain higher access when the virus is run on a normal user account.
The backdoor part of the virus attempts to create two new devices named "/dev/hdx1" and "/dev/hdx2", and if the creation succeeds, it checks for the existence of the two standard network interfaces 'eth0' or 'ppp0', and attempts to set them into "promiscuous" mode. It also attempts to create an "Exterior Gateway Protocols" (EGP) raw socket, and put it into listening mode.
When a special EGP IP packet arrives, the virus will check whether the 23rd byte in the data-packet is 0x11, then it will check for the presence of a specific password, as a 3-byte string at the offset 0x2a in the buffer. If these two conditions are met, the backdoor will check for a "command" byte, which is either 1 or 2 - if the "command" byte is "1", it will spawn a standard "/bin/sh" shell, which the attacker can control on the remote system.
Two strings can be seen inside the virus, but they are not used anywhere in the code. These strings are "snortdos" and "tory".

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